Accounting for Goodwill Pre&Post SFAS 142 and the Implications for Earnings Management by Wu, Liang Jian
University of Connecticut
OpenCommons@UConn
Honors Scholar Theses Honors Scholar Program
Spring 5-1-2012
Accounting for Goodwill Pre&Post SFAS 142 and
the Implications for Earnings Management
Liang Jian Wu
University of Connecticut - Storrs, ljw4715@yahoo.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/srhonors_theses
Part of the Accounting Commons, Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics Commons,
and the Finance and Financial Management Commons
Recommended Citation
Wu, Liang Jian, "Accounting for Goodwill Pre&Post SFAS 142 and the Implications for Earnings Management" (2012). Honors Scholar
Theses. 457.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/srhonors_theses/457
Accounting for Goodwill Pre&Post SFAS 142 and the
Implications for Earnings Management
Liang Jian Wu
University of Connecticut
Undergraduate Senior Honors Thesis
Dr. Robert Hoskin
Associate Professor of Accounting
Advisor for Senior Honors Thesis
Spring 2012 Semester
Wu, Liang Jian – Honors Thesis
Goodwill Accounting Pre&Post SFAS 142
1
Abstract
This thesis explores how impairment charges driven by management assessmenthave led to the possibility of earnings management under the SFAS 142 standard. The goalof carrying out this research is to help the user understand the implications behindallowing management to judge impairment charges (US GAAP) versus pre SFAS 142 whenintangibles such as a goodwill were amortized (currently IFRS).How has SFAS 142 opened the door for earnings management? If there is evidenceto prove this assumption, then what factors drive management's impairment decisions.This information is pertinent to investors when analyzing a potential investment asgoodwill can often be a large amount for companies that grow inorganically. Givingmanagement the ability to judge impairment has allowed more leeway in accounting forgoodwill, begging the question of how impairment charges can change earnings, sizes ofbalance sheets and affect stock prices in the market. The user reading this paper will cometo understand the accounting for goodwill under SFAS 142 which would allow them toexplore at least some metrics that motivate a manager's actions.By looking at how companies have taken goodwill write downs, analyzing how largethey are, and exploring how management have assessed these impairments in the year ofthe adoption of SFAS 142 by FASB, the goal is to determine the drivers of management'sdecision in regards to their decision to impair or not impair their goodwill.
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I. Introduction & Background
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued the Statement of FinancialAccounting Standards (SFAS) 142 to supersede APB 17 and methods for accounting forGoodwill and Intangible Assets. APB 17 stated that intangible assets, specifically goodwillwere to be amortized every period (not to exceed forty years) over its "useful" life. Thissuggests that intangible assets after a certain time period were to lose their value from thenormal basis of operations. This is similar to how fixed assets depreciate to the end of theiruseful lives. The FASB, however revisited APB 17 and felt that it wasn't capturing the trueeconomic effect of the transaction taking place when a company records goodwill. Itreleased SFAS 142 to provide the financial reporting community with a better method foraccounting for intangible assets and goodwill. The key highlights to SFAS 142 are:
 SFAS 142 assumes that goodwill and all other intangible assets are long livedindefinite assets that must be tested for impairment at least annually. This is achange from APB 17, which suggests that goodwill and all other intangible assets arefinite lived and must be amortized over a predetermined useful life with anarbitrary ceiling of 40 years. SFAS 142 further eliminates this 40-year useful lifeperiod restraint.
 APB 17 provided little guidance on goodwill impairments and the criteria in termsof testing for goodwill impairments. SFAS 142 provides guidance on goodwillimpairment testing as a two-step process that begins with an estimation of the fairvalue of the reporting unit. In this two-step process, the first step assesses if the
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reporting unit is potentially impaired, the second step measures the amount ofgoodwill impairment to be taken, if any.
 SFAS 142 also provides guidance for testing other intangible assets at least annuallyfor impairment.
 SFAS 142 requires disclosure of information about goodwill and other intangibleassets in the years subsequent to their acquisition that was not previously required.Required disclosures include information about the changes in the carrying amountof goodwill from period to period.
SFAS 142 moves away from the systematic accounting method outlined in APB 17that is arbitrary but predictable. SFAS 142 requires that management assess goodwill forimpairment on an annual basis allowing management to make a judgment regarding theappropriate value of goodwill. Management must compare the fair value of the reportingunit with its carrying value. Generally impairment is necessary if the fair value is below thecarrying value of the reporting unit. The issue that arises is that the "fair value" is subject tomanagement's professional judgment, opening the door to earnings management.Management may benefit in certain situations from not taking impairment loss, whichinclude but are not limited to:
I. Earnings are hovering around a threshold, and taking an impairment loss togoodwill will cause earnings to fall below this threshold with the implication thatinvestors might be disappointed in the earnings results or possibly that
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management may not qualify for a bonus in a plan that is based on achieving anearnings target.II. Earnings are hovering around a threshold such that taking an impairment loss togoodwill will violate certain debt covenants.III. Other key metrics such that taking an impairment loss to goodwill will cause anegative reaction/response from current/future investors.
Jordan and Clark (2004) also cited the possibility that management may beencouraged to record an impairment loss if such an action would not bring about anynegative consequences. This is known to be the "Big Bath" theory of earnings management.For example, if earnings are already high, and taking an impairment loss will not bring onthe negative consequences outlined above or if earnings are already so low that anadditional impairment loss will not bring about significant consequences to the existingsituation, then the manager may choose to do so, again without much added negativeresponse from outsiders.
In these regards, SFAS 142 has the potential to increase earnings volatility andcreates another opportunity for management to strategically manage earnings, henceallowing them to present financial information that is not necessarily fairly presented andnot capturing the underlying economic effects as intended by the FASB and SFAS 142. Thispaper will examine a sample set of companies that contain a significant amount of goodwillon their balance sheets and investigate conditions under which management has decidedto take an impairment. Ultimately, financial reporting is meant to capture the underlying
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economic effects of transactions taking place within companies through the use of asystematic accounting system. The application of SFAS 142 may not capture this if, in fact,management is exercising an opportunity to strategically manage earnings.
The FASB and standard setters are constantly conducting research in the field offinancial reporting relating to fair value assessments by managers. Fair values of assets andin this case fair values of reporting units are often hard to assess as market participantsand different stakeholders hold different opinions on how to value such assets. SFAS 142gave managers the responsibility and the ability to assess the fair value of a reporting unitbased on an impairment test. However, the assumptions that feed into the impairment testare subject to management intent and discretion. Management has the leeway to decide afair value amount (subject to auditor review) that may not necessarily reflect theappropriate fair and economic value of a reporting unit but rather can identify a value thataligns more with the strategic goals of the firm. The value identified can more closely alignwith the incentives that a manager may receive if they achieve a certain result. Managerscan manipulate earnings by choosing to impair goodwill or deferring impairment based onwhich-ever decision is more beneficial to the firm. If managers act with this intent, SFAS142 has failed to accomplish the FASB's goal to develop accounting standards that allowfirms to account for transactions fairly so that by following these standards firms arecapturing the underlying economic reality of these transactions.
Furthermore, many in the academic community have argued against SFAS 142 inregards to the sporadic impairments that follow such a random pattern leading to earnings
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volatility. In APB 17, goodwill was amortized and followed a pattern that was predictableand spread out over a useful life. Sloan and Li (2011) conducted a study in which theylooked at the patterns of firms applying SFAS 142 and what the implications were tovaluation of goodwill. In their paper, they concluded that SFAS 142 leads to untimelyimpairments, inflated goodwill balances and increased earnings volatility. This arisesbecause of management discretion in assessing the fair value of goodwill. Sloan and Li(2011) also concluded that with SFAS 142, accounting for goodwill fails to improve thefinancial statement user's ability to assess the probability of future cash flows and values ofgoodwill, a goal the FASB intended in SFAS 142. By presenting managers with anotheropportunity to manage earnings, users of financial statement are not necessarily beingpresented with statements that reflect the underlying economic reality behind the firm andits operations. Sloan and Li (2011) argue that strategic decisions can supersede accountingdecisions that reflect the economic reality of the transaction leading to mispricing of firmsin the market.
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II: Case Analysis of AOL Time Warner, Inc.
When SFAS 142 was issued, the FASB gave companies a one-time opportunity torecognize an impairment charge as "due to accounting change" which affects net incomebelow the line. This also suggests that there is an incentive (as we will see in the followingcase example) to impair goodwill to the appropriate fair value without having negativereactions from the capital markets and investors. Investors may treat a charge recognizedas "due to accounting change" as not relating to the operations of the company and maywrite it off in their own analysis of the company. The AOL Time Warner merger provides aninteresting perspective into the one-time opportunity to have an impairment recognized asbelow the line following the adoption of SFAS 142.
In the year following the AOL Time Warner merger, the company, upon the adoptionof SFAS 142 in the first quarter of 2002, took a goodwill write down of $54 billion to thegoodwill that resulted from the AOL Time Warner Merger. The market perceives goodwillas the excess or premium that is paid to acquire a company. Generally, in order foracquisitions to occur, a premium is paid over the book and/or market value of the targetcompany. Pre-SFAS 142, companies could have placed less emphasis on the accounting forgoodwill and more on bidding for companies, even if this meant exorbitant prices. Thereason for this is that under APB 17, goodwill impairments were rare as goodwill wasamortized. This meant that companies could focus less on assessing reporting units forannual impairment and have the expectation of what amortization schedules would looklike from their acquisitions. SFAS 142 significantly changed that in the sense that if
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companies were to pay exorbitant prices for the company's they are acquiring, and it isn't a"fair value" to pay for the company, they may likely have to take large impairments insubsequent years. Like in the case of AOL Time Warner, a $54 billion impairment togoodwill created a lot of press coverage questioning the merger deal in the first place.However, AOL Time Warner was able to strategically manage the impairment andaccounted for it as a "cumulative effect of an accounting change." This was an option givento managers of companies as a way to account for goodwill impairment following theadoption of SFAS 142.Beatty and Weber (2005) mentioned in their research that companies may beinclined to take impairments following the pronouncement because the market maydiscount this as simply the one-time effect of an accounting change as oppose to a write-offthat signals an actual decrease in value of the acquired company. This is stating that if AOLTime Warner were to take this impairment in subsequent years such that they can nolonger recognize it as a "cumulative effect on an accounting change," then it would simplyappear as an impairment charge on the income statement. The market could perceive thisdifferently as a true decrease in value.SFAS 142 requires companies to test for impairment, but it does not require muchdisclosure for what led the company to impair goodwill. Often times, it simply statessomething along the lines of "due to the valuation services performed by an independentappraiser or as a result of internal analyses we conclude that we must take an impairmentto goodwill." This leads to information asymmetry between financial statement users andthe company, ultimately resulting in a lack of understanding of how the decrease in value
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came to be. In this sense, managers can easily take an impairment charge in the year ofadoption with explaining to the market what led to the decision to do so.
III. Related Research
In this paper the results from the research conducted by Beatty and Weber (2005)will be partially replicated. Beatty and Weber believed that in the year of SFAS 142adoption, certain variables caused managers to take impairments to goodwill in the year ofadoption and recognize it as an expense due to accounting change. In this sense,stakeholders may interpret the impairment charges taken to not be a result of operationsbut rather one of a mandatory accounting pronouncement. The FASB mandated that in theyear of adoption, all goodwill impairments are to be recognized below the line as a result ofimplementing SFAS 142. Managers can perceive this as a one-time opportunity to impairtheir goodwill without significant repercussions as a mandatory accounting change effect,which is consider to be below the bottom line where as future impairments are consideredin other income. Other managers however, may be able to justify the fact that they maynever need to take the impairment to goodwill as they waive the benefit of treating anypossible impairments below the line due to a mandatory accounting change.
In this paper, a subset of the variables identified by Beatty and Weber (2005) will beused to test what drives and motivates a manager to impair goodwill on the books. Beattyand Weber argue that management intent is a factor that drives accounting action if thereare outsiders judging the outcome to such an action. One such example that they used was
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debt covenants on the debt contracts that certain firms hold. They argue that if a firm'scapital structure contains a greater amount of debt where certain covenants depend on thedebt to equity ratio metric, that a reduction in net income via an impairment would furtherreduce equity making the debt to equity ratio even worse leading management to perhapsavoid taking the impairment. From this we can reasonably predict that a manager of acompany with a large debt to equity ratio is less likely to impair goodwill thus preventingthe triggering of the debt covenants.
IV. Hypothesis Development
After reading related research and accounting literature, the following hypothesesare formulated regarding the variables that affect whether a company decides to takegoodwill impairment in the year of adoption of SFAS 142 by FASB.
Hypothesis I: Debt to Asset RatioCompanies with high debt to asset ratios would be less likely to take goodwillimpairment charges. Companies whose capital structure is characterized by high levels ofdebt exhibit the possibility that any hit to earnings will trigger debt covenants. Triggeringmultiple debt covenants can disrupt a company's operations and capital structure causingthem to look for other ways to refinance their activities. Managers are more likely to waivethe impairment to goodwill to subsequent years or never choose to take the impairmentsto avoid triggering these debt covenants.
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Hypothesis II: Net IncomeCompanies with lower amounts of net income will be less likely to take goodwillimpairment charges. The capital markets, the investment community and the stakeholdersof companies keep a close eye on the net income figure as a way to assess performance bymanagement. If a company is publicly or privately traded, capital market constituents focusheavily on earnings and earnings per share figures as an indication of how efficient thecompany's operating activities are being converted to profitability. Stakeholders assessmanagement's performance using the net income figure as a general and overall gauge tosee if management has met its duties to all stakeholders. Therefore managers place a lot ofemphasis on this figure and ensuring that they are, at a minimum, meeting earningsexpectations if not actually beating them.
Managers considering taking goodwill impairment will look to the pre-reportedearnings and assess what the after-effects of a goodwill impairment will be on the netincome figure. If the net income figure is low to begin with because of poor companyoperations, managers are less likely to impair their goodwill as to further decrease theirearnings figure. Jahmani, Dowling and Torres (2010) commented in their paper on thelikelihood that managers will actually take an impairment to goodwill. They concluded intheir findings that if a firm had consecutive losses for three years, they are less likely toimpair their goodwill. This suggests that managers would want prevent a situation whereearnings take any further hits. In terms of accounting for goodwill, they would be reluctantto take any impairment that would further decrease net income figure. With theintroduction of SFAS 142 managers are able to accomplish this as management discretion
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is a key difference in that managers can now assess their goodwill for impairment, givingthe rise in opportunity to earnings management.
It is also important to note that the Big Bath theory of earnings management takesthe opposite view from that of Jahmani, Dowling and Torres (2010) and claims if acompany is already exhibiting a net loss, managers may be inclined to take an impairmentto goodwill in the current year as to prevent taking impairment and losses in futureperiods. Jordan and Clark (2004) argued that companies are more inclined to have negativeresults all in one year if given the opportunity to do so as to prevent losses from futureperiods. Managers who choose to take an impairment to goodwill in the current year of anet loss will be padding earnings in subsequent periods making results appear morepositive than they actually may be in reality. Jordan and Clark (2004) claimed that ifcompanies are already exhibiting low earnings and negative results, the added penalty totaking a large write-off to goodwill is marginal. The burden to impair goodwill will beremoved from future periods and this will allow firms to expect better earnings in futureperiods.
Hypothesis III: Total AssetsSmaller companies will be less likely to take goodwill impairment charges. Theargument is that a larger firm, holding all else constant would presumably have moreresources than smaller firms that would allow them to absorb impairments to theirgoodwill. Bigger firms are more "prepared" to take such write-offs to goodwill because of a
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greater amount of assets on their books, the impact of an impairment to goodwill isunlikely to impact them in the same way as a firm with a significantly fewer assets.
Hypothesis IV: Return on AssetsCompanies with a lower Return on Assets (ROA) metric will be less likely to takegoodwill impairment charges. ROA as calculated by net income divided by total assets takeson similar logic from the net income discussion above. ROA is another key metric that thecapital markets and stakeholders use in order to assess the performance of a company.Firms that have a low ROA will be less likely to take goodwill impairments and furtherdrive down the ROA metric. With SFAS 142, managers are able to strategically takegoodwill impairments to preserve metrics like ROA specifically and may not necessarilyreflect the underlying economic reality of the events taking place in operations. Managerswill manage earnings in such a way that if ROA is extremely low in one year they will defertaking a goodwill impairment to subsequent years, whereas if managers are more likely totake an impairment to goodwill in the current year if ROA is on the higher end and they can"afford" to take a hit to ROA without penalty and negative feedback from theirstakeholders.
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V: Research Design
The design will test the relationship between the hypothesized variables and the decisionto impair or not. The following model is used:
Impair = β0 + (β1 x Debt) + (β2 x Net Income) + (β3 x Total Assets) + (β4 x Return on Assets)Where:Impair = "1" if the decision is to impair and 0 otherwiseDebt = Ratio of debt to assetsNet Income = Reported net income during the yearTotal Assets = Total value of assets reported per bookReturn on Assets = Net income divided by total assetsThe model will be tested in the initial year of adoption which is 2001.
Sample Set SelectionThe adoption of the standard allowed firms to adopt in 2001 and therefore the sample usedto test the hypotheses came from this year. This resulted in 1,470 firms that reportedgoodwill and of this, 108 firms chose to impair goodwill. To further refine the sample, firmswere dropped from the sample if they had insignificant amounts of goodwill relative tototal assets. Firms were eliminated if the percentage of goodwill to assets was less than orequal to 10%. This reduced the sample to 634. This sample likely contains a subset of firmsfor which impairment of goodwill was clearly not a possibility. This would be the case ifgoodwill was less than the difference between the market value and the book value ofassets (the key test for impairment). While the decision to impair is based on the subunits
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of the firm to which goodwill is allocated, this overall assessment of the firm serves as aproxy for what may be the case at the subunit level. This refinement in the sample yielded atotal sample of 265.Goodwill Data Sample Set Selection
Firms from Compustat with Goodwill from FY 2001 1,470
Less: Firms from FY 2001 where Goodwill as a % of Total Assets
was 10% or less
836
Firms from FY 2001 where there is a significant amount of
Goodwill on their balance sheet
634
Less: Firms where Goodwill is less than the difference between the
Market value and the Book value of assets
369
Final Sample Set Size 265
Regression Results
The tablet below presents the result of the regression.
Variables Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value
Intercept 0.114080679 0.026841605 4.250143737 2.98007E-05
X1 - Debt to Assets -0.227414328 0.09268777 -2.453552704 0.014802067
X2 - Net Income -0.000245397 0.000107727 -2.277954319 0.023541237
X3 - Total Assets 6.90979E-06 6.52014E-06 1.059761069 0.290236812
X4 - Return on Assets -0.211747893 0.027994926 -7.563795535 6.76083E-13Note that all of the independent variables are significant at the P=0.05 or betterlevel with the exception of total assets. Note further that the marginal effects of Debt toAssets and Return on Assets are larger given the size of the coefficients than Net Incomeand that they are both significant at the P=0.01 or better level. This suggests that these twometrics are larger and more significant drivers in the decision to impair.
From the above results we can extrapolate that a firm's debt to assets ratio andreturn on assets ratio significantly influences a manager's decision on whether to take an
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impairment in the current year or defer impairment to subsequent years. The coefficientreturned from the regression analysis for the debt to assets variable suggests that if a firmhas a higher debt to assets ratio, they are less likely to impair which is consistent with ourexpectation. This is in line with common theory that a firm is less likely to take animpairment loss to goodwill and risk triggering debt covenants. Firms that have high debtto asset ratios are the firms who carry higher amounts of debt on their books and naturallywould have to be more careful with operating results as to not disrupt the capital structureof the firm. If the firm were to take an impairment that crosses the threshold of a debtcovenant, then immediate repayment of the debt is likely to be required by the firm'screditor. The coefficient suggests that managers will be less likely to take an impairment iftheir firm has high levels of debt and would like either defer impairment to future periodsor never have to take the impairment to goodwill. SFAS 142 gives the manager leeway tochoose whether or not to impair as to protect the firm from violating its debt covenants.
The coefficient results from the ROA variable suggests that for a firm with a higherreturn on assets ratio, they are less likely to impair their goodwill. This is a departure fromthe hypothesis stated above that a firm with lower ROA are less likely to impair theirgoodwill but is somewhat consistent with the Big Bath theory in that low ROAs make itmore likely for firms to impair. ROA measures how effectively a firm is utilizing its assets togenerate profits. A firm with a high ROA is using its assets effectively to generatesubstantial profits. If a ROA metric results in a less likely chance of impairment to goodwill,this can arise because managers who are facing good results in a given year are less proneto decrease those results. A high ROA is generally perceived well by the capital markets and
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stakeholders, and on a good year taking an impairment loss may contain an added penaltysuch that the capital markets and the stakeholders react negatively to the firm's decision.Managers are likely to keep the favorable results this year and assess the fair value of theirgoodwill on their books to be higher than the true fair value.
From the regression analysis, there is evidence that managers base their decisionfor goodwill impairment under SFAS 142 on certain factors of their firm. This is adeparture from the intent of FASB to issue and set standards such that managers arepresenting financial information that captures economic reality. The analysis conductedsuggests that managers are making decisions regarding their firm's goodwill strategicallyto manage earnings in any given year as oppose to making decisions that reflect theunderlying reality of the transactions taking place. The decisions of management are nowless predictable and more volatile than the preceding APB 17 standard that allowed for asystematic amortization of goodwill over a useful life. Amortization of goodwill under APB17 was very systematic similar to the calculations of depreciation for fixed assets. Users ofthe financial statement can reasonably predict cash flows under APB 17 they can easilypredict what future amortization amounts are based on looking at the goodwill footnotecalculations. By adopting SFAS 142, the motivation behind accounting for goodwill is notnecessarily in line with providing users greater probability of predicting a firm's currentand future cash flows. FASB also states that from an accounting theory perspective,goodwill under APB 17 was amortized over a useful life initially to signal that the excess offair value from an acquisition is being "used up" in operations as operating years passed.Goodwill was being amortized to show that a firm that completed an acquisition and
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expected synergies was realizing them as time passes. This would mean that in future yearsthere was no need to state that there is an excess in fair value on the books of the acquirerif all the benefits have been realized. SFAS 142 takes a different view and states that if anacquirer recognizes goodwill, that value stays on the books until the a fair value assessmenttests shows that the acquired company is no longer as valuable as once perceived duringthe acquisition. Sloan and Li (2011) mentioned that this lag in recognizing the value froman acquisition disrupts the pricing of the acquirer in the market arising from anunpredictability in the accounting for goodwill. In essence this gives management theleeway to use the goodwill asset and the goodwill impairment as an avenue to manage theirearnings to show the results that can strategically benefit their firm. The decision to impairor not hinges on the variables mentioned above.
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VI: Conclusion
This paper and related research has shown that at least on some level the drivers forthe decision to impair goodwill is strategic and evidence of earnings managementsfollowing the adoption of SFAS 142. If this is the case, SFAS 142 has failed to achieve theFASB's goal of capturing underlying economic reality. Managers tend to make decisions fortheir business that sometimes can present a better situation than what it actually shouldbe. Using companies in the sample and looking at AOL Time Warner's 10-K as a specificexample, comments and footnotes relating to goodwill generally outline that the companytests goodwill on the books for impairment annually under SFAS 142. Companies hireindependent valuation firms and conduct internal analyses to determine if the value of thereporting unit has been impaired, but they are not required to disclose additional detail.This creates a disconnect between what the SFAS 142 wants to accomplish and what it infact does accomplish in reality. As noted in the study conducted above, managers assessmetrics such as their firm's debt to assets ratio and return on assets to gauge whether itwould make business sense (as opposed to accounting sense) to take an impairment. Thisbegs the question, are managers assessing the fair value consistent with the guidelines onfair value put forth by the FASB. In closing, there is evidence that suggests thatimplementing SFAS 142 gives managers an opportunity to strategically manage earningsand that in having managers run their own impairment test, unverifiable estimatesproduced by managers will exist. Financial statement users are therefore is a lesserposition to assess the decision taken by the manager. The unpredictability and irregularity
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of these impairments under SFAS 142 ultimately lead to greater earnings volatility whichmay disrupt the decisions carried out by the stakeholders and investment community.
VII: Current Developments
In the fall of 2011, the FASB amended SFAS 142 by introducing Step "0" in theimpairment assessment process. Under the new update to SFAS 142, companies may nowelect to perform Step "0" and based on the results they may not have to actually performthe whole two-step impairment process. Step "0" states that managers need to ask thequestion, "is the fair value of a reporting unit more likely than not, (basing it off of a 50%threshold) less than the carrying amount?" If the answer is yes and it is more likely thannot that the fair value of the reporting unit is less than the carrying amount, then themanager proceeds to carry out the two-step impairment test as stated by SFAS 142. If theanswer is no and it is not more likely than not that the fair value of the reporting unit is lessthan the carrying amount, the manager is not required to perform the two-step impairmenttest. In the second scenario, the manager only needs to comment on the assessment in thefinancial statement footnotes. The FASB issued this update to emphasize the qualitativefactors that drive the fair value and impairment of goodwill. Smaller companies proposedthe idea that under SFAS 142, it became costly to carry out the two-step impairment testbecause of costs associated with identifying fair value. Smaller companies contended that itdid not make business sense to incur these costs when they can reasonably tell that therewas no impairment to goodwill. The FASB agreed with this issue, and as a result issued theupdate to SFAS 142 to alleviate this issue. The FASB also offered guidance to companies in
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the update on what the key items (non-exhaustive list) are that factors into thedetermining the fair value of a reporting unit. This is also meant to alleviate the costsassociated with performing impairment testing.
This addition gives the manager another opportunity for earnings management anddivergence from reporting the underlying reality of the reporting unit. The extension toSFAS 142 has now made it easier in the sense that managers can simply write-off the factthat an impairment must take place because they can internally justify that the reportingunit in question does not pass the Step "0" test. The FASB claims that they are giving rise tofocusing on the qualitative aspects rather than the quantitative aspects that led to adecision of impairment. The FASB contends that a manager should consider the followingfactors when assessing the likelihood that the fair value of the reporting unit is greater orless than the carrying value: macroeconomic conditions such as fluctuations in the creditmarkets, industry and market considerations such as decrease in business profitability inthe sector, cost factors such as materials and labor, financial performance of the reportingunit, other changes in the reporting unit that could affect key areas to the business, asustained decreased in the share price of the reporting unit. The FASB is placing theresponsibility of determining fair value on the manager's shoulders from a qualitative lens.Through this, the FASB wants to achieve the balance between cost efficiency and stillcapturing the economic reality behind a reporting unit.
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VIII: Proposal for Future Research and Caveats
Given that the research outlined in this paper only modeled decisions following theadoption of SFAS 142, specifically looking at the decision to impair and recognize as belowthe line accounting treatment, a similar regression model can be ran on subsequent yearssimilar to the methods used in the Beatty and Weber (2005) paper and this paper. It isimportant to note that the regression used in this paper modeled out the decision to impairfocusing on a year where managers had a one-time opportunity to recognize theseimpairments below the line, but can still be useful in predicting impairments in the futureeven when the one-time opportunity does not exist. Jahmani, Dowling and Torres (2010)concluded that in using a sample set of companies from the years 2003 to 2005, they foundcertain variables affected a manager's decision to impair. The variables they used wereprimarily related to net income.
Another caveat is the time frame of the research presented in this paper. A longertime frame would allow more refined research relating to the following areas:1. Compiling data reported in annual filings relating to the goodwill footnote andanalyzing how companies describe the process and methods they used that led themto their impairment decision.2. Compile companies into different industry sectors, and conclude if certain industriesare more prone to impairment. The research firm, Duff and Phelps compiled aresearch report that outlined goodwill impairments across different industry
Wu, Liang Jian – Honors Thesis
Goodwill Accounting Pre&Post SFAS 142
23
sectors. This suggests that certain industry, due to the nature of their industryoperations may be more prone to take impairments to goodwill.3. Analyze compensation structures of firms and assess if executive compensation ismeasured based on certain factors where an impairment to goodwill be negativelyaffect them. Beatty and Weber (2005) compiled the compensation data for theirsample set, and propose the argument that firms where a executive compensationand bonuses are dependent on the earnings of a firm, managers may be less proneto take goodwill impairments as to raise the bonuses they receive.
As mentioned above, the FASB has updated SFAS 142 to include Step "0" givingmanagers the possibility to skip the two-step impairment test outlined in SFAS 142 if theydeemed that it is not more than likely that the fair value of the reporting unit is greaterthan the carrying value of the reporting unit. Future research can be conducted once firmsstart implementing and using Step "0" in their accounting for goodwill to track how manyfirms have indeed used the Step "0" update, and of those firms what variables affected thedecision to do so. In addition, of the firms who chose to impair their goodwill, how manyconducted the Step "0" analysis such that the results of the analysis signaled the managersto move onto the two-step impairment test because there is a "more than likely chance"that goodwill is impaired.
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